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OF U.S. MANUFACTURING*
Emilio Pagoulatos and
Robert Sorensen

I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper, drawing on the analytical framework of international trade'
and industrial organization, reviews and tests some new hypotheses concerning
the effect of foreign trade and investment on domestic industry profitability.
Since Bain' s, [1] seminal paper in 1951, virtually all analyses of the market
structure:..profitability relationship have ignored the role of foreign -factors •

1

While a few recent studies have incorporated variables which account for the
impact of foreign competition, with the exception of a paper by L. Esposito
and F. F. Esposito [12], these studies have involved countries other than the
.

U.S.

2

The purpose of this study is two-fold:

f-irst, to extend the analytical

· framework proposed by Esposito_ and Esposito by investigating not only the role
of import ,competition, but also the impact of export opportunities and foreign
direct investment in the structure-profitability relationship and second, to
provide a statistic.al test of the advanced hypotheses based upon one aspect of
U.S. industrial performance:

price-cost margins.

The organization of the paper is as follows:

Section .II discusses the

relation between domestic profits and internation~l economic activity.
third section · describes the data and variables.
Section IV.

The

The results are presented in

A final section considers the conclusions and general implica~.

tions of this. study.

--2Ii. FOREIGN

TRADE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND INDUSTJ:lY PROFITABILITY

Economic theory predicts that in long run competitive equilibrium
resources will be allocated efficiently

when

the prices of all goods equal

'i'

their

marginal cost and p:roducers earn only normal rates of return.

Since

departures from the competitive n9rm lead to inefficient allocations of resources and ·result in some producers earning greater than normal returns, it
- has been one objective of industrial organization research to determine what
particular market characteristics can be identified with the earning of excess
· economic profits.

Traditionally, this type of analysis has related industry

profitability to dimensions of market structure~ such as the degree of seller
concentration, the growth and elasticity of·del!land, and the conditions of entry
as refl~cted by the extent of product differentiation, the importance of scale
. economies and the prese_nce of absolute cost advantages.
.

.

.

• if an economy were cl·osed, these variabllies would theoretically be· sufficient to describe the major determinants of inter-industry differentials in
profitability.· In an open economy a mor_e complete specification of the structureprofitability relationship should accmmt for foreign _factors, since industries
-differ with respect to international trade and investment activity,

In parti-

cular, attention should be given:·:to the impact of actual and potential import
competition, the availability of export opportunities arid the extent of foreign
direct investment and multi-national activity.
The role of actual import competition is straightforward.
,

.

.

.

-·

The presence of

.

foreign suppliers increases the number -of competitors in the domestic market.
In effect, this reduces domestic seller concentration-and should result in more
competitively determined prices and lower profits for the domestic firms.

Modern

oligopoly theory su,ggests, however, that the existence of potential competition.

-3That is, the threat of entry and by extension

may produce similar results.

the threat of foreign entry, may constrain domestic firms to.adopt entry forestalling prices which more closely approximate competitive levels..
.

.

.

.

regard, Esposito and Esposito [12,343]

In this
.

have pointed out that foreign pro-

ducers may more easily overcome barriers to entry, common to both potential
domestic and foreign entrants and, thus, maypose theinost"innnediate" threat
of -entry and exert the strongest influence
established· domestic firms.

cm

the pricing decisions of the

To the extent, therefore, that· actual or poten-

tial import competition limits the ability of established firms to maintain
prices above long run average c9st, it would be expected, other
things equal, that profits rates would be lower in industries facing. the greatest
degree of import competition.
While it has been generally recognized that import competition could
improve dqmestic market performance, the impact of export opportunities has
been almost totally overlooked.

Recent work by Caves [5; 6], however, suggests

that the existence of export markets may serve to constrain
domestic industries to a more competitive pricing behavior.

Consider, for

example, a protected profit maxfunizing monopolist who is currently selling
-only in the domestic market at prices above competitive world levels. - If
protection is eliminated, and as a result the monopolist is unable to discriminate between the

domestic and foreign market, profit maximizing strategy leads

to the monopolist.exporting the product, expanding output in the domestic market
and reducing the domestic price to world levels.

3

Caves [5] has also argued

that this type of result is equally plausible under.conditions of oligopoly,
in that the presence of alternative export markets may render sellers less conscious of their mutual interdependence in th.e domestic market and lead to less
collusively determined _prices.

The impl:i.c_ation is that reliance upon export

-4sales, in effect, dilutes an industry's market power and should lead to
prices and profits

being closer to competitive levels •. It must be noted,

however, that· this analysis assumes domestic firms to be unable to engage in
i

price discrimination (dumping) between the foreign and domestic markets,

If

tariff protection or other impediments to trade do allow the domestic firms
to price discriminate and the world demand curve is more elastic than the
domestic one, domestic prices and profits are likely to rise as expofr sales
expand.
The other international factor which may influence the profitability of
domestic firms ·is the extent of their foreign investment and multi-national
activity.

While early analyses of direct foreign investment focused primarily

upon macroeconomic theories of international capital movements, recently attention has been given to the study of the international corporation in terms of
industrial organization theory.

These studies [4:; 5 ; 17] sµggest that foreign

investment occurs mainly in industries characterized by oligopoly in both the
parent and host countries,

In addition, "horizontal" investment, which results

in firms producing abroad the same or similar products to those produced in the
domestic market, is likely to prevail in industries where product differentiation
is preval~nt, while "vertical" investment,, undertaken in order.to.produce raw
materials or other inputs for the production process at home, more typically
arises in undifferentiated oligopoly.
The effects of direct foreign investment of a vertical nature are analogous
to those of vertical integration in the' domes.tic market.

Upstream foreign in-

vestment in order to produce a necessary input, for example, may allow domest.ic
processing firms to achieve lower input costs via importation of 'semi-finished
goods and/or ra:w mate.rials from foreign subsidiaries,

4

This would be especially

-s~
important in cases in which firms i'ntegrate backward into less developed countries in order to obtain raw mat_erials which otherwise might not be forthcoming, due ·to shortages in overhead capital or entrepreneurial talent in the
host country.

Furthermore, vertical investment abroad which provides estab-

l;i.shed firms control over sources of non-ubiquitous raw materials, substantially
raises the barriers to entry in the domestic market at the processing level.
The profit nates earned by the established fi:rms can, thus,· be elevated without
attracting new rivals.

All of these factors suggest that vertical direct for-

eign investments would increase industry profitability in the domestic market.
It was indicated earlier that horizontal direct foreign investments typically
arise in oligopolis~ic industries characterized by product differentiation •. More
specifically, it is argued that horizontal investments take place when a firm
possesses a unique rent earning asset, such as a patented invention, ·a differentiated product, or specialized managerial expertise in the production and distribution of a•product, on which maximum profits can be earned in foreign markets
.

.

only through foreign production.

The establishment of foreign _subsidiaries is,

thus, seen as a strategy providing for growth and the earning of further rents
on these unique forms of capital without imparing the high rents currently
.

.

.

.

being earned in the domestic market.
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Industries dharacterized by horizontal

direct foreign investment, therefore:, are those likely to be able to earn and
maintain supra normal profits in the domestic market.

III. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND DATA
In this section, empirical evidence is presented on the nature of the
structure-profitability relationship when account is made for the influence of
international tr~de and multi-national activity.

The industry sample consisted

-6-

of 88 United Nations Standard International Trade Classification (S.I.T.C,)
three-digit industry groups of the U.S. manufacturing sector for 1967.

The

s. I ,T ,C, :i.n.dustrial classification was utilized because of constraints on
the' availability of foreign trade and investment data.

Since the domestic

market structure data could only be obtained from figures provided by the
U~S. Bureau of Census according to their Standard Industrial Classification
System (S .I.C.),

an industry was included in the sample if_ it were possible

to locate comparable figures provided in the S.I.T.C. system with those in
the S.I.C. system.

In this regard, a concordance between the two systems

developed by Hufbauer [16 ~ 208-210] proved very helpful.
Multiple regression equations are utilized to estimate the relationship
between industry profitability and industry structure,

The equations contain

five independent variables representing major structural ~eterminants of pro·. fitability, along with several combinations of ,additional independent variables
representing the international factors previously mentioned.

The construction

and data sources utilized for the variables are discussed below.
oretical rationale for the domestic

Since the the-

structure variab[es is·widely covered

in_ the 1-iterature, we provide only brief justification for their inclusion in
the model.
Industry Profitability
The dependent variable used in the analysis to represent profitability
was the price-cost margin, defined as the gross return (before taxes) expressed
.

6

as a percentage of industry value added.·

Gross margin on value added was used ·

in preference to_ the more 'frequently used gross margin on sales, because it is
less sensitive to differences in both the degree of vertical integration and the
stage in the production process of the sample industries.

Utilizing Census

data [27; 28; 29), the margin was estimated as:
(1)

Price-cost margin (PCM) == Value added - Payroll - Rentals
Value added

-7Value added was obtained by the Census ,by subtracting from value of shipments,
the cos ts -of materials, supplies and containers, fuel pur.chased electricity,
and contract costs. · Subtracting payrolls and rentals from- value added and
. dividing by value

added

results in a figure approxim.atirtg profits be-

fbre taxes, plus interest, plusdepreciati~n ~s a percentage of value added.
Seller concentration
Oligopoly theory suggests that the ability of firms to collude (tacitly
or overtly) in order to maintain prices above long run average cost of pro-.
duction is greater in industries in which there are few sellers that dominate
the market.

Price-cost margins ·are thus expected to be pos:j.tively related to

some measure of the degree of seller concentration~
concentration w:ere utilized in "the analysis.

Two measures of seller

The first was a weighted four-

firm concentration ratio (CR) with the weights being value of shipments.
Since weighted concentration ratios have come under attack [2] as being representative of actual ,industry concentration, an employment entropy measure (E)
which could be constructed more directly was also utilized.

Entropy, a measure

borrowed from information theory, indicates·the degree of uncertainty of securing a random buyer.

Thus, high entropy is indi_cative of low levels of con-

centration, while-low entropy indicates high levels of concentration.
.

.

is thus expected to be negatively relate d to price-cost margins.

Entropy

7

Capital-Labor Ratio
The inclusion of gross capital cost in the formulation of the price~cost margin
implies that, ceteris paribus, margins will be greater in capital intensive
industries.

In order to account for differences in margins arising from dif-

fering capital intensities, th~ capital-labor ratio (K/L) was included as an
. explanatory variable~

Th~ capital-labor .ratio has be~n provided

for our

sample of industries by Hufbauer [16) ~\:\'rtlfs, \t,gure was estimated as net book
value of. depreciable assets per. emple>;·Je'.:.~:J/·

-8Barriers to.Entry
Oligopoly theory suggests that the higher the barriers to entry into an
industry, the higher is the "limit price" which producers can charge without
indticing·entry.

-Profit margins should, thus, be positively related to the

height of barriers to entry.

Two variables were introduced into the model to

account for barriers attributable to economi~s· of scale and product differen- _
tiation.
An economies of scale barrier (ES) was approximated with a measure de..:.

veloped by Hufbauer. [16].

This variable reflects cross industry differentials

· in the achievement of ·increases _in value added per worker as the size of plant
increases.

Industries capable of achieving increases in productivity as the-

size of plant increases are considered to possess scale economy advantages as
evidenced by higher scale coefficients.

To the extent that plants differ in

product mix, quality of labor employed, age of equipment, etc. this type of
measure is subject to some bias, and empirically it appears. to give lower
estimates of scale economies than engineering methods have provided [16].

Re-

cently, however, a similar scale proxy was developed by Caves,~-!!:.!_. [7] with
some success, especially iri reducing collinearity

between concentration and the

scale economy proxy.
Product differentiation is very difficult to quantify.

It may represent

genuine differences in physical characteristics, distribution or customer service between competing products, or may simply reflect differences cre:9-ted in
the minds .of buyers through sales promotion techniques such as advertising.
Bain [1] has suggested that the most important source of differentiation is

. .
9
a dvertising.

Since this form of differentiation is more likely to occur in

consumer as opposed to producer goods industries,. the consumer good ratio (CGR),

-9:-

constructed by Hufbauer [16], was adopted as a proxy for the degree of product
differentiation.

This is a measure which is developed through input-output

analysis and reflected the· percentage of total industry sales appearing as
.

.

.··.

.

'

consumer goods directly and indirectly after the first and second rounds.
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Because. advertising and product differentiation is an important barrier to
· en·try primarily in consumer. goods industries, price cost. margins are expected
to be higher, the· higher the consumer goods· ratio~
· Growth Rate in Demand
It has been suggested that the growth rate of demand will also affect
industry profit margins [12; 26] and some empirical evidence
supports this proposition.

When an industr.r experiences high growtl)

in demand, firms my feel less compelled to behave in a competitive fashion
and secure temporary profits.
in industries

in which

When growth is slow or declining (especially

fixed costs are ·high), firms may find it necessary to

squeeze profit margins in order to maintain adequate levels of sales.

Further-

more, .slow growth may lead to breakdowns in collusive agreements among oligopolists~

This reasoning would assert that growth in demand would exert a posi-

tive influence upon profit margins.
'

.

percentage change in value

added

To estimat~ growth ·of demand. (GD)» the
between 1963-67 was calcuJ.ated.

~ntport Com.petition
While we have hypothesized the likely consequences of actual and potential import competition, no empirical counterparts have thus far be~n proposeq.

Three alternative proxies were adopted, each of which is sµbject to

limitations discussed below, in order to measure import competition.

-10-

First, we included as explanatory variables barriers to entry faced by
foreign producers:

nominal tariffs (T)

and non-tariff barriers (NTB). 11

The higher the degree of tariff and non-tariff protection the greater are the ·
barriers to foreign suppliers and the higher would be the

11 limit

mes tic producers could charge without inducing foreign entry.

price" do-

This suggests,

cet.eris paribus, a prediction· of a positive relationship between the measures ·
of protection and price-cost margins.

One problem with this approach, however,.

is that we do not know the purposes for which the import barriers were originally
designed.

For example, industries characterized by chronic excess capacity or

high uni.t cost, ma:r have sought ancf obtained protection and, thus, in some in~
stance$. high protection may be simply be associat.ed with inefficient industries
characterized by· low profitability •.
Secondly,

t'he ratio of current imports to domestic value of shipments (MVS').

was introduced as a proxy for foreign competition.

We conjecture_that ·the higher

the import share the. greater the degree of ac.tual and potential import competition.
This is the approach utilized by Esposito ·and Esposito [12] •
this proxy is subject to several limitations.

However, the us.e of

Ind,eed, it may not adequately des- ·

crib~ potential competition, since potential 'cqmpetition is not related to the
current share .held.
by- .foreign
firms, but rather.the .-elasticity
of foreign supply
.
.
.
.
'

witll respect to the domestic price.

Therefore, a small~ post, foreign share

could simply reflect a high elasticity of· foreign supply and a f'limit price!!
which yields relatively low profits.

Moreover, it_ has been observed [19; 21] that

in soma U.S. industries. (particularly those characterized as oligopoly) firms
have readily yd.elded up a share of the domestic market to foreign producers
rather' than reduce prices and margins.

The-explanation for this phenomenon is.

that, at least in the short-:run, firms wouldrather give·up -some portion of the

-11ma.rket to foreign firms, than engage in· price cutting which if misinterpreted
by rivals, could destroy agreed upon price structures.

Under these circum-

stances, the· share of the market .captured· by foreign suppliers may have to rea_ch
some critical level before price cutting and shaving of margins is initiated.
The final proxy used was the growth rate in imports (GM) over the 1963-67
time period.. While this variable is subject to the quaiifications given the
import share variable, it is nonetheless appealing in that it may more accurately describe the threat of import competition to domestic producers.

For

·example, a low current import· share may tend to understate the degree of import
competition in industries in which imports have been growing rapidly, while· a
high value of import share would tend to overstate import competition when imports have been declining.

Thus, high import growth, indicative of greater

degrees of foreign competition, should exert a negative influence on profits
being earned by domestic industries.
··Exports
Since we hypothesized that exporting_opportunities, as well as import
competition, would affect industry profitability, we included the ratio of
exports to domestic value of shipments (XVS) as an explanatory variable in
the model.

In the absence of dumping, the hypothesis provided earlier suggests

that a greater reliance on export sales, other things equal, should reduce an
industry's profitability.
Di:tect·Fo:re{gn·Investment
Vertical and horizontal direct foreign investment activity were hypothesized to lead to higher industry profitab_ility.

_A complete _test of the hypo-

theses presented would require detailed information

concerning the magnitude,

location and specific type of investment undertaken for.each of the industries
in the sample. _ Since this type of da~-~tf{>fetiprt:sently available, a measure
(1.\\\~j ·\: :, : /\,.
,

''

'

-12.:...

developed by Bruck and. Lees was utilized.

Their measure of multi-national

acti vit:y (MN), based upon data for Fortune's 500 largest industrial corporations, estimates the percentage foreign component of total economic activity
for the largest firms within each industry.

12

This variable was included

in the model as a general proxy for direct foreign investment with the expectation it would exert a positive influence upon industry profitability.

IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results of the multiple regression equations relating price-cost
margins to various combinations of structural variables are presented in Table I.
Equations (1) and (2) include only domestic structural .variables as independent
variables, while equations (3) through (8) contain additional variables which
·
.
13
represent various .formulations of the foreign factors.
Inspection of Table I indicates that, in general, the coefficients for the
traditional market structure variables all possess the hypothesized signs.

Price-

cost margins were positively related to concentration, whether measured by the
weighted concentration ratio or entropy and the coefficient for the concentration
ratio was significant in all cases at the 10% level or better.

The coefficients•

for the consumer go_ods ratio and the capital-labor ratio also display the expected
.

.

.

.

positive sign and both were significant in all cases at the 1% level.

Finally,

the coefficient for the economies of scale variable in all cases, and that for
the growth rate in demand in all but two cases, display the expected positive
sign but. nei·ther is significant in any formulation of the model.
While these results confinn the importance of traditional domestic structural
variables iri affecting industry· profitability, our interest lies more with the
results obtained for the foreign, factors.

The regression coefficients for the

I

Regression Equations Relating Price-Cost Margins to Domestic Market Structure Characteristics and
Foreign Trade and Investment, 1967.
•Ct-values in parentheses)

TABLE 1:

Domestic Variables
Equation
Number

Intercept

CR

(1)

364.94a
(10.15)

1.15b
(1.82)

(2)

444. 77a
(9. 08)

(3)

319.59a
(7.75)

(4)

414.98a
( 7. 32)

. (5)

359.37a
(10.32)

(6)

494.52a
(9. 02)

(7)

367 .56a
(10. 09)

(8)

444. 69a
ca: 79)

E

-5.62
(. 865)
1.33b
(2.08)
-8.19
(1.27)
1.36b
(2 .10)
-13.16b
(1.90)
1.04c
(1.61)

xvs

R2

CGR

GD

4.89a
.138
(4. 82) (1.06)

110.94a
(2. 83)

.120
( .269)

.29

5.03a
.158
(4. 78) (1.20)

100.13a
(2.55)

.191
(.419)

.27

3.90a
(3.81)

.044
(. 347)

147.54a -.174
(3. 74) (.395)

(2. 74)

(.937)

3.92a
(3.67)

.062
(. 480)

134.74a -.082
(3.42) ( .182)

4.47a
(3 .00)

-.088
(.761)

4.06a
(3. 97)

.052
(. 403)

118.00a
(3.12)

.137
(. 318)

2.94b
(2.02)

.040
(.308)

3. 77a
(3.53)

.053
(. 406)

111.61a
(2. 97)

.290
(. 660)

3.41b
(2.34)

.057
( .439)

4.28a
.135
(4.15) (1.06)

103.67a
(2.66)

.026
( .060)

3.47b
(2.36)

-.064
(.539)

-.104c
(1.45)

4.26a
.150
(3.96) (1.17)

96.43a
(2.48)

.105
(.236)

3.80a
(2.56)

-.050
( .409)

-.103

K/L

ES

Foreign Variables
MN

4.03a

-.106

T

NTB

MVS

GM

F-tests

8

.40

F(4,77) • 3.48b

(. 858)

.935
(2. 71)

-.682
( .550)

.906a
(2.58}

.38

b
F(4,77) • 3.41

-.222b
(2.17)

.37

F(3, 78) ~ 3. 36b

-.255b

.37

F(3,78) • 3.91'

.35

F(3, 78) ., 2.45c

.34

F(3,78) "' 2.72b

-1.06

(2.36)

C

-6.29
( .955)

(1.41)

The significance of the regression constants was tested by a two-tail t..-t:est whi.le the significance of the slope coefficients was tested using a one-.tail
t-test.
a indicates that the coefficient is significant at .the 1% level while b and c indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level _respectively. The
independent variables are:
Foreign variables:
Domestic variables:
CR= weighted average 4-firm concentration ratio
MN = index of multinational activity
.
E = employment entropy measure of concentration
GM= percentage growth of imports from 1963 to 1967
K/L= capital-labor ratio
XVS= exports as a percent of value of shipments
MVS= imports as a percent of value of shipments
ES= scale economies
CGR= consumer good ratio
T = nominal tariff rate
GD= percentage growth.of value added from 1963 to 1967
NTB= non-tariff barriers

....I

'f
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variable repr~senting non.::.tariff barriers. to foreign competitors display the
expected p·ositive sign and were significant at the 5% level, while those for the
nQIIlinal tariff rate variable were not significant and have. negative signs.
These results suggest that non-tariff barriers may directly .affect profit margins
by de facto restricting imports, while nominal tariff rates may effect price levels,
but not necessarily price-cost margins.

The degree of effective tariff protection,

.rather than nominal protection is likely to be more important in affecting pricecost ·margins [22, · 346],

but estimates of effective tariff rates could not be

obtained at our level of agg:tegration,

Nonetheless, these results do·support

the hypothesis that protection from import competition (es·pecially of a I1on-ta:tiff
nature) has allowed industries to .maintain margins in excess of what· would have ·
been obtained if the economy were more open to foreign producers.·.
This conclusion is supported by _the results obtained utilizing current import
share and. growth rate of imports as proxies for import competition.

The coeffi-

cients for the import share variable have negative signs and are significant at
the 5% level, while those for the growth rate in imports also display negative signs
and are· significant at the 10% -level.
The res tilts obtained for the export share variable were inconclusive.

While

in most cases the coefficient for this variable was negative, it was never statis'tically significant.

Thus, no firm support can be given to the proposition that

export opportunities and reliance on export markets Eor sales constrains producers
to more competitive pricing and output decisions.
Finally, the coefficient for the direct foreign investment variable was positive as expected, and was significant in all cases at the 5% level or better.
fortunately the rather crude construction of this' variable does not allow

us

Unto

disentangle the precise relationships' and linkages ,involved.· At this point we can
only indicate that

a

general and strong relationship exists between the degree of

-15an indus.try 's direct foreign investment and its resulting profitability and that
further work in this area is warranted as more detailed. in~lus try s tatist;i.cs
become available.
In order to evaluate the overall impact of the foreign factors in the structure
profif relationship one final test was undertaken.

The error sum of squares was

computed for the restricted form of the model which only included domes tic variables .and for the. various unre·stricted forms of•. the model which included combinations of the foreign variables.
'

The significance of the foreign factors was then

'

· detenniiied by an F test for the reduction in error sum of squares between the·
restricted and unrestricted regression models.
/

The F statistics obtained are

presented in Table 1 and ~re significant,.with one exception, at the 5% level.
This result further-reinforces the conclusion th.at foreign influences are important detenninants of domes tic price-cost margins in U. S. m~ufacturing.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has investigated the role of international trade and investment
activity on domestic industry profitability.

The main purpose has been to in-

tegrate these foreign factors with traditional market structure variables in
.an empirical test of the determinants of price-cost margins in U.S. manufacturing industries.

The results obtained p~ovide considerable support for the

hypothesis that market structure influences industry profitability.
.

.

.

In par-

:

ticular,fewness of sellers, as measured either by a weighted concentration ratio
or entropy, exerted a positive and. statistically significant influence upon
industry price-cost margins.

In addition, the empirical results suggest that

even in the United States, where the foreign· sector constitutes a small percentage of GNP, foreign factors repre1:1ent.a fruitful addition to conventional
domestic Structure variables in explain,i;t1g ~inter..-industry differenti.als in
price-cost margins.

-16Although the relationship between foreign trade. and investment and domestic
· industry profitability is. a complex one, a number of conclusions can be drawn.
The evidence indicates that industries which faced greater degrees of actual
and potential import competition obtained lower price-cost margins.
.

In particu-

.

lar~ lower margins have been maintaine4 in industries in which the import share
·of output and the growth rate of imports are higher and the · degree of import
protection (especic1.lly of a non-tariff nature) is lower.

Secondly, an ind us try 's

profitability was systematically related to the degree of direct foreign invest-.
ment of the industry.

lnd.ustries which have expanded across national boundaries

through horizontal or vertical direct investment have maintained higher pricecost. margins.
For research purposes, our results suggest that "further analyses of the
structure performance relationship should take into account the impact of foreign
factors·.

In particular, the impact of the multi-national corporation on the

structure and conduct of domestic industries needs· more attention both at a
theoretical and empirical level. ·
Finally, from a policy point of view the results of this study suggest that
an opening of the economy through the reduction non-tariff barriers could improve
industry performance, but· that considerations of the balance of trade and balance
-

.

of p~ytnents should be made before such p~licies are adopted.
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,

to Greg McGowan for computational assistance and an anonymous referee for helpful
suggestions., -Responsibility for the final product rests, of cours~; with the authors. 1.

An excellent survey of these studies was -recently published by Weiss [31, 362.;_411]

2.

These include the studies by McFetridge (22] and J<?nes, et al. (19] on Canada,
Khalilzadeh ".'"Shi.razi [20]

3.

on

the United Kingdom and House [15] on Kenya.

For a partial equilibrium proof of this result, see ,Caves and Jones -[6., 209-210].
For a general equilibrium proof see _Caves [5].

4.

The economies realized in obtaining inputs through vertical integration rather
than using the market are discussed in detail by R.H. Coase [8].

5.

It is of course possible that similar rents could be earned through exporting
the product or through licensing a foreign producer.

Factors _which would make

foreign production the most profitable alternative include:

the existence of

tariffs-and transportation costs, the necessity to adapt the specialized product
or knowledge to local market conditions .and the necessity to tprovide ancillary
service to the foreign customers.
6.

It is important to note here that margins will also be affected-by differences
in elasticity of- demand.

For- a fuller d:iscussion of this point see:

Collins

-.
and Pres to-n [ 9, 9--10]
7.

This measure was calculated_ along the lines suggested by Horowitz [ 14] .

-18-

Definitionally, entropy (E~ = - I. qi log
employment in the ith fdirm.

2 qi, w~ere qi equals the share of

In monopoly s,ituations there is no uncertainty

and qi equals 1, thus E assumes a value of O.

Entropy increases with either

an increase in the number of firms or an increase in equality of firm size.
For a more complete discussion of the merits of entropy vs. other concentration
measures see:

[11; 18].

The data utilized to construct this .variable was

found in [27].

8.

For a more detailed description of this variable see Hufbauer [16, 221].

- - - - - - - - - --------- ------·----·---- ...
·. 9.

While one mi~ht prefer to use a more standard measure. such as the a.~vertising
to sales ratio, figures for this could not be obtained at our level of aggregation.

In addition to providing a proxy for product differentiation, the

consumer goods ratio would help to control for the fact that advertising expenditures are not netted out of the price-cost margin.
10.

More specificaily, the consumer goods ratio is defined as:
8kh + I 8 kn. 8 nh18n
(CGR) = - - - - - - - - ' - - Sk
where:

Skh and Skn equal sales by industry to k to households and industry

n respectively,_ Snh represents s·ales by industry n to households, and Sk an·ah
S
represent total sales of industry k and n respectively.
11.

The data for nominal tariff rates were ·obtained from [10] and those for non-tariff
barriers have beeri estimated by Walter [30, 341-342].

The non-tariff barrier

proxy was defined as the percent of connnodities subject to non-tariff barriers
within each SITC·commodity group.

12.

Values for imports and exports were obtained from [24; 25] ~ for domestic value
of shipments from [27] and the proxy for multi-national activity from [3].
Foreign content was measured by eit_her one or a combination of the following .
factors:

sales, earnings, employment; or production abroad.

..
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13.

Two statistical problems are frequently encountered in this type· of analysis:
multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity.

Inspection of the correlation

matrix indicated that multicollinearity was probably not a severe problem.

The highest intercorrelation among independent variables was .• 31 between the
'

.

concentration ratio and the capital-labor ratio.

Since the possibility still

exists that one variable may be a linear combination of two or more variables,.
a test beyond examination of the correlation matrix was undertaken.
a procedure suggested by Murphy [23, 375-376]

Utilizing

which compares the sums of

the incremental contribution of each independent variable in explaining variations
in the.dependent variable to the collective or Joint contribution of all variables simultaneously, no detection of multicollinearity was evident.

Since it

would riot be unreasonable to suspect that the variance of di~turbances in profit
rat~s would differ 'between large vs. small industries or highly concentrated
vs. unconcentrated industries heteroscedasticity may pose problems.

We tested

for this by means of- a Quandt-Goldfeld test and were unable .to accept the
hypothesis _of heteroscedasticity.
below the critical level of 2.1.

The resulting F values were L 3 and 1. 5,
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